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A Constitutional American Foreign Policy
By ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG*
So far this year, our bicentennial celebrations have been marked,
for the most part, by testimonials to the growth of our domestic liber-
ties-the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, the Civil War
Amendments, the enfranchisement of women, and the like. While I
join in the praise of our proud heritage of civil rights, I would remind
you that they were not accomplished in a vacuum, but rather, in relation
to world affairs. Indeed, the Declaration of Independence marks not
only the birth of our nation but its entry into the arena of foreign policy.
In this article, I will examine the current thrust of American
foreign policy and propose what Professor Arnold Wolfers has called the
"optimistic" Anglo-American perspective of world politics.1 It is the
belief that nations can live peacefully together, if only statesmen will
observe the precepts of law. In short, American foreign policy for the
seventies and beyond must comport with our constitutional goals of
liberty and the consent of the governed. The secret diplomacy of state
necessity should be replaced by a form of statecraft which once again
reflects the will of the majority.
Today, a lively and important debate is raging both in Congress
and in scholarly journals about the future of American foreign policy.
Through this dialogue thoughtful experts have expressed concern that
as a reaction to Vietnam, America's capacity to conduct a viable foreign
policy has been seriously, if not irretrievably, impaired. They argue
in support of this grim hypothesis that we have lost the will to exercise
our proper role and influence in world affairs and are returning to the
"splendid" isolationism which characterized past eras of American
political thought.
It is my opinion that the governed, whose consent is imperative
for a viable foreign policy, are not devoid of the desire to participate.
* Former justice of the United States Supreme Court.
1. A. WOLEFRS, ANGLO-AmEI.CAN TRADITION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, at xx (Wolfers
& Martin eds. 1956).
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On the contrary, the public and Congress are insisting on a constitu-
tional foreign policy and urging that it be right-both in assessing our
genuine interests and in observing moral terms.
This public and congressional attitude, it seems to me, should be
welcomed. A constitutional foreign policy will be more reassuring to
worthy friends and allies than a foreign policy which flaunts the Con-
stitution and lacks either legislative or popular support. What is the
essence of a constitutional foreign policy? Simply put, it is the partner-
ship between the executive and Congress in foreign affairs mandated
by the Constitution. The Founding Fathers gave deliberate and
thoughtful consideration to whom the foreign policy function should be
delegated. Fearful of undue concentration of power in the executive,
the framers were painstakingly cautious about reposing unchecked
executive power in the president for conducting foreign affairs.
In this vein, Alexander Hamilton remarked in the Federalist:
The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opin-
ion of human virtue which would make it wise . . . to commit
interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which con-
cern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to the sole disposal
of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would be a President
of the United States.2
The framers, however, were practical men. They knew that foreign
affairs could not be conducted day-to-day by Congress or even by
a congressional committee. On the other hand, they were determined
that Congress should play the deciding role in setting policy in the
foreign and military fields. The Constitution, therefore, represents a
pragmatic approach to a shared responsibility in the area of foreign
relations between the executive and Congress.
It is striking to see how many of the enumerated powers of
Congress relate to the area of foreign relations. The powers over war
and peace include the power to declare war, to raise and support
armies, to provide and maintain a navy, to establish a militia, to grant
letters of marque and reprisal, to make rules for the government and
regulation of the armed forces, and to provide for the common
defense.3 The foreign economic powers include the power to regulate
2. THE FEDERALisr No. 75, at 467-68 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, §. 8. The framers of the Constitution were not alone in
their recognition of war as the ultimate extension of foreign policy. The German geo-
politician, von Clausewitz wrote: "We see therefore, that War is not merely a political
act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying
out of the same by other means." 1 K. voN CLAuSEWrrZ, ON WAR 23 (rev. ed. J. Gra-
ham transl. 1968). Another realist, the late Chairman Mao, observed: "In a word, war
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commerce with foreign nations, to set import and export duties, and
to regulate the value of foreign coin, i.e., set exchange rates.4 Con-
gress' diplomatic powers include the powers to advise and consent to
the ratification of treaties and to the appointment of diplomatic repre-
sentatives.5 Congress' international legal powers include the powers
to define piracy, to punish crimes against the law of nations, and to
make rules for captures in wartime. 6 Congress' power of the purse
enables it to pay the debts7 and to make appropriations by law.8 And
Congress has the power to make all laws which are necessary and
proper for carrying into execution all of the foregoing powers.9
By contrast, the express powers in foreign affairs given to the
president by the Constitution are strikingly limited. The president has
the power to receive ambassadors, 10 to appoint ambassadors," to make
treaties 2 (subject to Senate consent), to serve as commander-in-
chief,' 3 and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.' 4  By
implication, the Constitution does empower the executive to conduct
foreign policy; accordingly, he is in charge of international negotiations.
Yet, prior to the product of negotiations becoming effective, he is
required to submit nonroutine agreements to the Senate for its advice
and consent.' 5
The president is the sole representative of the nation in its foreign
relations;' 6 Congress, on the other hand, possesses the power of the
purse and the sword. As in domestic areas, powers are to be shared-
and Congress is not the junior partner. As in the war powers area,
the concept of inherent executive power in foreign affairs, as distin-
guished from implied, is without constitutional foundation. The Con-
stitution is allergic to the doctrine of inherent powers. We are a nation
of laws, not of men. At best, the executive's role in the foreign affairs
cannot for a single moment be separated from politics." SELEcrED WoRKs OF MAO Tsn-
TUNG 153 (Peking ed. 1965).
4. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
5. Id. art. II, § 2.
6. Id. art. I, § 8.
7. Id.
8. Id. art I, § 9.
9. Id. art. I, § 8.
10. Id. art. , §3.
11. Id. art. I, §2.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. art. II, § 3.
15. Id. art. II, § 2.
16. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 3.19 (1936).
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of this nation is a shared role with Congress. The president leads our
foreign relations, but it is Congress that ultimately determines foreign
policy. This partnership between the president and Congress is not
easy to come by, but its practical achievement is a sine qua non for
a viable foreign policy.17
There is yet another important limitation on exclusively presiden-
tial foreign policy. The basic premise of our Constitution is that the
consent of the governed is imperative. Results in public opinion polls
establish that the people will support foreign policy goals and objectives
which are constitutionally defined, reflect our vital interests, and are
morally right, but will withhold their consent from those which are not
so grounded.'
It is never easy to define what is moral, particularly in the diplo-
matic area. But, at the risk of being simplistic, it appears to me that
a foreign policy is morally right if it is righteous rather than opportunis-
tic, ethical rather than cynical, candid rather than secretive. With
respect to defining our vital interests, the Constitution clearly requires
that the executive propose and that the Congress dispose.19 The cur-
rent public wariness over American foreign policy is caused in great
measure by the departure from the Constitution, of the war-making by
recent presidents, the lack of a constitutional definition of our vital in-
terests, the practice of "real" rather than "moral politick," and the use
of excessive secrecy and personalism in the conduct of foreign affairs.
The period of Richard Nixon's administration was one of extra-
ordinary secrecy and personalism in foreign policy. It was a decade
in which congressional, bureaucratic, and nongovernmental interests
were excluded from world events by the sheer force of the involvement
of the president and Dr. Kissinger's great-but now diminishing-
popularity and diplomatic successes. Our future foreign policy must
be more open, less personal, and less secretive. It is all to the good
that Congress is reasserting its constitutional role in foreign affairs.
This will result in a less covert and less personal foreign policy. But
this is not to say that the executive branch can easily lay aside its pro-
pensity for super-secret negotiations; nor is it to say that every incoming
diplomatic cable ought to be made public the next day. Democratic
17. See Goldberg, The Constitutional Limitations on the President's Powers, 22
AM. U.L. REv. 667 (1973).
18. See generally J. MUELLER, WAR, PRESIDENTS AND PUBLIC OPINIoN (1973).
19. See 6 J. MADIsoN, THE Wm~rns OF JAMES MADISON 138, 147-50 (G. Hunt ed.
1906).
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diplomacy does not require "open covenants . . . openly arrived at' 'aG
-a rather wistful Wilsonian concept never totally possible to realize.
The diplomacy of a democracy does mandate, however, at the very
least, open covenants secretly arrived at.
Part of the uneasiness about our recent and present foreign policy
arises from misgivings about diplomatic understandings and commit-
ments not made public. I can see good reason why secrecy is required
when matters are in the negotiating stage. I can see little reason why,
when negotiations are completed and agreements or commitments are
made, that they should not be fully disclosed for congressional and pub-
lic scrutiny. Every agreement, of course, may not reach the magnitude
of a treaty, which constitutionally requires ,senatorial approval.2 But
what the Constitution does not command, it may still inspire, and our
Constitution inspires the open disclosure of agreements imperative to
the functioning of the democratic process. 22
A pervasive aspect of recent foreign policy is reliance upon "big
power politics." This "real politick" reflects the dream of an inter-
national utopia in which a few great states would use their power to
settle the affairs of the world, much as the major powers of Europe
did in the century after the Congress of Vienna. But we would do well
to recall that when the rule of the "concert of Europe" finally collapsed,
the balance of power fell -to pieces. In its wake two world wars
ensued which were to alter the old map of Europe beyond recogni-
tion.23  This happened in great part because, in large areas of the
world, the international order of the nineteenth century did not redress
grievances, but merely submerged them, until in our century they
erupted in revolution and world war.
Public distrust of the Helsinki Accord24 reflects concern that the
deep-seated grievances of the peoples of eastern Europe were papered-
over by the accord. We must beware in practicing "real politick" of
accepting a philosophy of international affairs in such a way that
morality and power become antithetical. Power not ruled by morality
is a menace; morality not served by power tends to be a delusion. We
20. Wilson, The 14 Points, in 2 DOCUMENTS OF Amjmuc HIsTORy 317, 318 (H.
Commager ed. 1934).
21. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
22. In enacting 1 U.S.C. § 112b (Supp. V, 1975), Congress required the secretary
of state to inform Congress of executive agreements entered into by or on behalf of the
president.
23. See E.H. CARm, NATIONALIS AmD AFTR 21-26 (1945).
24. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BULL. No. 1888, CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CooPER-
ATION rN EuRoPE 323-50 (1975).
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must never forget that our nation derives its great influence in the world
not from great physical power alone, but also from the fact that our
basic law, however imperfectly realized, is premised on the moral prin-
ciple of equality and dignity of all persons. No American president
nor any Congress can assume any longer that Americans will, as they
often have done in the past, adhere to the notion that: "Our country
. . . may she always be in the right; but our country, right or wrong."
This slogan is no longer on the masthead of the Chicago Tribune. It
is no longer blithely accepted by the American people. They are
patriotic but not jingoistic.
Our country will have to be constitutionally right in its foreign
policy and commitments: right in acknowledging that both the presi-
dent and Congress have complementary roles in the area of foreign
policy, right in assessing where our real interests lie, and right in a
moral as well as geopolitical sense.
